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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
John Leroy Pena appeals from the judgment of the district court entered upon his
guilty plea to possession of methamphetamine. On appeal, Pena argues the district court
erred when it denied his motion to suppress.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
At around 3:15 a.m. Officer Claiborn saw a car parked in the furthest southeast
corner of the Windham Hotel parking lot. (7/6/17 Tr., p. 8, L. 18 – p. 9, L. 25.) The car
was running, but had no headlights on. (Id.) The car was not parked near an entrance or
an exit even though there were many spots available. (7/6/17 Tr., p. 9, Ls. 16-25.) The
car was parked in a part of the lot that was dark and not lit at all. (Id.)
Officer Claiborn drove past the parked car and ran the license plate, then came
back around and parked seven to ten feet away from the car. (7/6/17 Tr., p. 10, L. 9 – p.
12, L. 11.) The car was not blocked and could have pulled out. (Id.) Officer Claiborn
exited his vehicle and Pena also exited the parked car. (Id.) Pena had his hands in his
sweatshirt pockets. (Id.) Officer Claiborn asked Pena why he was there and Pena said he
was there to pick up a friend. (Id.) Officer Claiborn asked Pena if he could check his
pockets for weapons and Pena said he did not feel comfortable allowing Officer Claiborn
to search him. (Id.; see also Ex. 1 at 1:10 to 1:25. 1) Officer Claiborn also asked for and
received identification from Pena. (Id.)

1

Officer Claiborn recorded his contact with Pena and the video was introduced as Exhibit
1. (7/6/17 Tr., p. 18, Ls. 2-21; Ex. 1.) The time stamp references are approximate.
1

Pena admitted he was on parole for burglary. (7/6/17 Tr., p. 13, Ls. 2-6; see also
Ex. 1 at 2:33 to 2:45.) Officer Claiborn looked in Pena’s car, without entering it, and saw
a saw sitting on the back seat. (7/6/17 Tr., p. 13, Ls. 11-21; see also Ex. 1 at 3:59 to
4:10.) A saw is a common tool used to cut locks during burglaries. (Id.)
Officer Claiborn asked for permission to search the car, and Pena said he could.
(7/6/17 Tr., p. 13, L. 22 – p. 14, L. 5.) This concerned Officer Claiborn because Pena was
very quick to say he could search his car, but did not want him to search his pockets. (Id.;
see also Ex. 1 at 4:24 to 4:35.) After running a check on Pena’s identification, Officer
Claiborn told Pena he was free to go. (7/6/17 Tr., p. 15, Ls. 3-11; see also Ex. 1 at 4:49 to
5:40.)
Officer Claiborn then saw Kleenex in Pena’s pockets and asked Pena if he could
put the Kleenex on the hood of his vehicle. (7/6/17 Tr., p. 15, L. 12 – p. 16, L. 16; see
also Ex. 1 at 5:42 to 6:30 and at 12:33 to 12:50.) Pena reached into his pocket with his
left hand, and “kind of fumbled around” for “25 seconds.” (Id.) It was apparent that Pena
was trying not to pull something out of his pocket. (Id.) When Pena did pull something
out of his pocket it was a bulbous glass object. (Id.) Officer Claiborn recognized it as a
tool used to smoke methamphetamine. (Id.) Officer Claiborn requested an assist officer.
(7/6/17 Tr., p. 16, L. 17 – p. 17, L. 25; see also Ex. 1 at 6:30 to 11:20.)
Officer Claiborn again asked Pena who he was picking up from the hotel and Pena
gave a completely different name. (See Ex. 1 at 7:15 to 8:30.) When Officer Meryl
arrived Officer Claiborn told Pena to put his hands behind his back. (7/6/17 Tr., p. 16, L.
17 – p. 17, L. 25; see also Ex. 1 at 11:20 to 18:36.) When Officer Claiborn went to grab
Pena’s hands, Pena quickly reached inside his pocket, pulled out the methamphetamine
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pipe and threw it on the ground. (Id.) After Officer Claiborn retrieved the pipe, Pena
admitted he had a bag of methamphetamine in his pocket. (Id.) Officer Claiborn found
the bag of methamphetamine. (Id.)
The state charged Pena with possession of methamphetamine and possession of
drug paraphernalia. (R., pp. 30-31.) Pena filed a motion to suppress arguing that Officer
Claiborn lacked reasonable suspicion to detain Pena. (R., pp. 35, 38-47.) The state
responded. (R., pp. 52-62.) The district court held a hearing on the motion. (R., pp. 6364.)
Officer Claiborn testified that his suspicions were initially aroused by the vehicle
parked in a dark part of the parking lot.
Q. Was there anything suspicious about that vehicle in that place
at that time?
A. Yeah. Just background on that area, it’s a high drug area,
especially between the hours of midnight and four a.m.
Where the vehicle was parked, it was not located anywhere near an
entrance or exit of the hotel. Where there were entrances, there were
multiple parking spots available. And the portion of the parking lot the car
was parked was not lit at all. It was very dark.
(7/6/17 Tr., p. 9, Ls. 16-25.)
Officer Claiborn testified that, before he saw the methamphetamine pipe, he told
Pena he was free to go. (7/6/17 Tr., p. 15, Ls. 3-11.) If, at that time, Pena had decided to
walk or drive away, Officer Claiborn would have let him go. (Id.) Once Officer Claiborn
saw the glass pipe, Pena was no longer free to leave. (7/6/17 Tr., p. 32, L. 18 – p. 33, L.
1.)
The district court entered a written memorandum decision and order denying
Pena’s motion to suppress. (R., pp. 67-79.) The district court found that the initial
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encounter was consensual and thus not a seizure. (R., pp. 73-78.) The district court
found that until Officer Claiborn saw the glass methamphetamine pipe Pena was free to
go. (Id.)
Pena pled guilty to possession of methamphetamine and reserved the right to
appeal the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress. (R., pp. 84-86.) The district
court entered judgment and sentenced Pena to two years with one year fixed. (R., pp. 9196.) The district court suspended the sentence and placed Pena on probation for two
years. (Id.) Pena timely appealed. (R., pp. 97-99.)

4

ISSUE
Pena states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err in denying Mr. Pena’s Motion to Suppress?
(Appellant’s brief, p. 9.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Pena failed to show the district court erred when it denied his motion to
suppress?

5

ARGUMENT
The Initial Encounter Between Officer Claiborn And Pena Was Consensual
A.

Introduction
The district court analyzed the relevant factors and found that the initial

interaction between Officer Claiborn and Pena was consensual. (R., pp. 73-78.) The
district court determined that Officer Claiborn’s observation of the glass pipe, combined
with Pena’s conflicting answers regarding his friend’s name, gave rise to reasonable
articulable suspicion. (Id.) It was only after Officer Claiborn developed reasonable
articulable suspicion that Pena was detained. (Id.) The district court denied Pena’s
motion to suppress. (Id.)
On appeal, Pena argues the district court erred when it determined that the initial
encounter was consensual. (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 11-20.) Pena does not argue the
district court applied the incorrect factors; rather, Pena disagrees with how the district
court applied those factors. (See id.) Pena fails to show the district court erred when it
properly applied the relevant factors and determined that the initial encounter between
Officer Claiborn and Pena was consensual.

B.

Standard Of Review
“The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision

on a motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the trial court’s findings
of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but freely reviews the application of
constitutional principles to those facts.” State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300, 302, 160 P.3d 739,
741 (2007). The power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts,
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weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial court. State v. ValdezMolina, 127 Idaho 102, 106, 897 P.2d 993, 997 (1995); State v. Fleenor, 133 Idaho 552,
555, 989 P.2d 784, 787 (Ct. App. 1999). The appellate court also gives deference to any
implicit findings of the trial court supported by substantial evidence. State v. Brauch, 133
Idaho 215, 218, 984 P.2d 703, 706 (1999).

C.

The District Court Applied The Correct Law And Correctly Determined That The
Initial Encounter Was Consensual
The district court found that, up and until Officer Claiborn saw the

methamphetamine pipe and developed reasonable articulable suspicion, his encounter
with Pena was consensual. (R., pp. 73-78.) Pena argues the district court erred when it
determined that the initial interaction between Pena and Officer Claiborn was consensual.
(See Appellant’s brief, pp. 11-20.) Pena argues that “the totality of the circumstances
demonstrates Mr. Pena was unlawfully detained through Officer Claiborn’s show of
authority, issuance of commands, direct language, disregard of Mr. Pena’s assertions of
his rights, and retention of Mr. Pena’s identification.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 13.) Pena’s
argument is not supported by the record or the applicable law.
The district court applied the proper law and correctly determined that the intitial
encounter was consensual.

(See R., pp. 67-78.)

“An encounter between a law

enforcement officer and a citizen does not trigger Fourth Amendment scrutiny unless it is
nonconsensual.” State v. Willoughby, 147 Idaho 482, 486, 211 P.3d 91, 95 (2009)
(citations omitted). To constitute a seizure, the officer must, “by means of physical force
or show of authority,” in some way restrain an individual’s liberty. Id. This “requires
words or actions, or both, by a law enforcement officer that would convey to a reasonable
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person that the officer was ordering him or her to restrict his or her movement.” Id.
(citations omitted). “[A] request for identification or mere questioning is not enough, by
itself[,] to constitute a seizure.” State v. Landreth, 139 Idaho 986, 990, 88 P.3d 1226,
1230 (2004) (citations omitted). “This is so because the person approached need not
answer any question put to him and may decline to listen to the questions at all and go
about his business.” State v. Osborne, 121 Idaho 520, 523-524, 826 P.2d 481, 484-485
(Ct. App. 1991) (citing Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497-498 (1983)). “Thus, where
an officer merely approaches a person who is standing on the street, or seated in a nonmoving vehicle located in a public place, and poses a few questions, no seizure has
occurred.” Id. (citation omitted). The relevant inquiry is whether, under the totality of
the circumstances, “a reasonable person would feel free to disregard the law enforcement
officer”; if so, “then the encounter is consensual.” Willoughby, 147 Idaho at 486, 211
P.3d at 95.
“A majority of jurisdictions have held that ‘the mere approach and questioning of
[persons in parked vehicles] does not constitute a seizure.’” State v. Zubizareta, 122
Idaho 823, 839 P.2d 1237 (Ct. App. 1992) (quoting W. LaFave, Search and Seizure
§ 9.2(h), at 415-16 and 408-409 n. 230 (2nd ed. 1987)); cf. State v. Ramirez, 121 Idaho
319, 322, 824 P.2d 894, 897 (Ct. App. 1991) (“An officer’s use of a flashlight to
illuminate the darkened interior of a vehicle” is not a search.).
Examples of circumstances that might indicate seizure, even where
the person did not attempt to leave, would be the threatening presence of
several officers, the display of a weapon by an officer, some physical
touching of the person of the citizen, or the use of language or tone of
voice indicating that compliance with the officer’s request might be
compelled.
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State v. Liechty, 152 Idaho 163, 168, 267 P.3d 1278, 1283 (Ct. App. 2011) (quoting
United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980)). “Other circumstances that may
indicate seizure include whether the officer used overhead emergency lights and whether
the officer took action to block a vehicle’s exit route.” Id. (citing Willoughby, 147 Idaho
at 487-88, 211 P.3d at 96-97; State v. Schmidt, 137 Idaho 301, 302-03, 47 P.3d 1271,
1272-73 (Ct. App. 2002); State v. Fry, 122 Idaho 100, 103, 831 P.2d 942, 945 (Ct. App.
1991)). The Court of Appeals in Liechty explained that “no seizure occurred when the
officer approached Liechty’s parked vehicle and tapped on his window.” Id. “Further,
the officer, without activating his overhead lights, approached Liechty’s vehicle alone,
without a weapon drawn, and did not physically touch Liechty or use threatening
language upon opening the passenger door.” Id. The seizure in Liechty only occurred
because the officer opened the passenger door without Liechty’s consent, stood in the
open passenger doorway, blocked Liechty’s exit, and questioned him. Id. at 169, 267
P.3d at 1284; compare State v. Osborne, 121 Idaho 520, 523, 826 P.2d 481, 484 (Ct. App.
1991) (no seizure initially occurred when the police first approached Osborne’s vehicle,
which was parked on a public street).
In Fry, the Idaho Court of Appeals determined that the police encounter was not
consensual and that Fry was “seized.” See Fry, 122 Idaho at 103, 831 P.2d at 945. In
Fry, the officers approached Fry who was sitting in a parked vehicle. Id. The Court of
Appeals found it significant that one of the officers, Officer Dunbar, “placed himself
directly behind Fry’s vehicle, the front end of which was nearly against the wall of a
building, making it impossible for Fry to drive away without running over Officer
Dunbar.” Id. (citation omitted).
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Here the district court reviewed applicable case law, including State v. Bly, 159
Idaho 708, 366 P.3d 193 (Ct. App. 2016); State v. Page, 140 Idaho 841, 103 P.3d 454
(2004); State v. Zubizareta 122 Idaho 823, 839 P.2d 1237 (Ct. App. 1992) and United
States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980) and determined the encounter was consensual.
However, Bly is not applicable to the present case because this
Court finds that Defendant’s encounter with Officer Claiborn was
consensual, and thus not a seizure. First, reference to the same factors
considered by the Idaho Supreme Court in State v. Page, as well as the
United States Supreme Court in United States v. Mendenhall, indicates
that Officer Claiborn did not employ any show of force or authority to
restrain Defendant’s liberty. Officer Claiborn approached Defendant alone
and did not call another officer to the scene until after he saw that
Defendant had a glass pipe. Additionally, there is no evidence that Officer
Claiborn removed his weapon from its holster or touched Defendant. The
patrol car was parked seven to ten feet behind Defendant’s vehicle, leaving
sufficient room for Defendant to leave if he so chose, and its overhead
lights were not activated. Further, the officer’s body camera footage
showed him speaking to Defendant in a casual and conversational tone.
Like the Zubizareta officer’s request that the defendant turn off his engine,
Officer Claiborn’s inquiry into the tissue paper in Defendant’s pocket
exhibited both the tone and phrasing of questions, not commands. Finally,
although Officer Claiborn did retain Defendant’s identification for
approximately four minutes while he checked for active warrants, he
returned it to Defendant and told him he was free to go before he asked
Defendant any questions about tissue paper.
As a result, under the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable
person would have no reason not to take the officer at his word and believe
himself free to go. Although Officer Claiborn did seize Defendant upon
observing the glass pipe in his hand, that observation, in addition to the
Defendant’s conflicting answers regarding his friend’s name, gave rise to
reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot. This
Court finds that until reasonable suspicion arose, Defendant was engaged
in a consensual encounter with Officer Claiborn, and not subjected to a
Fourth Amendment seizure.
(R., pp. 73-74.)
Here, Pena does not argue the district court applied the incorrect law; rather, Pena
disagrees with the district court’s conclusions. (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 11-20.) Pena
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argues that Officer Claiborn’s verbal communications “were pointed and a show of
authority” and Pena was only submitting to that show of authority. (Appellant’s brief, pp.
14-15.) The record does not support this conclusion. Pena was not simply submitting to
authority. He understood he had the right to refuse Officer Claiborn’s requests, and did in
fact do so. At the beginning of the interaction, Officer Claiborn asked to search Pena and
Pena refused to consent. (See Ex. 1 at 1:10 to 1:25.) And when he did refuse the request
to search his person, Officer Claiborn did not challenge or threaten Pena.

Officer

Claiborn simply said “Ok, that’s fine.” (See Ex. 1 at 1:10 to 1:25.)
The video shows Officer Claiborn speaking in a reasonable and conversational
tone with Pena. For example, early in the encounter, Officer Claiborn told Pena, “You’re
not under arrest, dude.” (Ex. 1 at 1:30 to 1:40.) The district court found “the officer’s
body camera footage showed him speaking to Defendant in a casual and conversational
tone.” (R., p. 74.) Contrary to Pena’s argument on appeal, Pena was not complying
under a show of authority. The district court did not err.
Pena also argues that Officer Claiborn’s car “partially blocked Mr. Pena’s car.”
(Appellant’s brief, pp. 15-16.) This is not supported by the record. The video recording
and Officer Claiborn’s testimony demonstrate that Pena’s car was not blocked. (See
7/6/17 Tr., p. 10, Ls. 9-18; see also Ex. 1.)
Q. Did you pull behind the vehicle that you saw?
A. Not directly behind. I drove past the vehicle, ran the license plate,
came back around and parked close to it.
Q. How far -- when you say close to the vehicle, how far behind the
vehicle were you?
A. I’d say seven to ten feet.
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Q. Could the car have pulled out, was there enough space that he could
have pulled out and left?
A. Yes.
(7/6/17 Tr., p. 10, Ls. 9-18.) The district court found that “[t]he patrol car was parked
seven to ten feet behind Defendant’s vehicle, leaving sufficient room for Defendant to
leave if he so chose[.]” (R., p. 74.) Pena’s assertion that his car was “partially blocked”
is not supported by the evidence or the district court’s factual findings.
Pena also argues that he was detained when Officer Claiborn ran his identification
and told him that “if everything clears out, then you’re fine.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 16
(citing Ex. 1 at 1:58).) Contrary to Pena’s argument, an examination and check of
identification is reasonable. Even when officers have no basis for suspecting a particular
individual, they may generally ask the individual questions and ask to examine
identification.” Fry, 122 Idaho at 102, 831 P.2d at 944 (citing Florida v. Rodriguez, 469
U.S. 1 (1984); INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210 (1984); State v. Zapp, 108 Idaho 723, 701
P.2d 671 (Ct. App. 1985)). The Idaho Supreme Court has held that if the initial contact is
valid and lawful, a brief detention of a driver to do a status check on the driver’s license
is reasonable for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. State v. Godwin, 121 Idaho 491,
495, 826 P.2d 452, 456 (1992) (“[W]e conclude … that a police officer’s brief detention
of a driver to run a status check on the driver’s license, after making a valid, lawful
contact with the driver, is reasonable for purposes of the fourth amendment.”). Here the
initial contact was valid and consensual, and thus Officer Claiborn’s request for
identification and running the status check did not change this from a consensual
encounter into an unreasonable detention. Further, after Officer Claiborn returned Pena’s
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identification, he told Pena he was free to leave. (7/6/17 Tr., p. 15, Ls. 3-11; see also Ex.
1 at 4:49 to 5:40.)
It was only after Officer Claiborn saw the methamphetamine pipe that the
encounter changed from a consensual encounter into a detention. (See R., pp. 73-78.) An
officer may seize an individual if the officer has reasonable, articulable suspicion that the
individual has committed or is about to commit a crime. See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S.
491, 498 (1983); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968); Fry, 122 Idaho at 103, 831 P.2d at
945. The methamphetamine pipe, combined with Pena’s changing answers about his
friend, provided reasonable articulable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot, and thus
Officer Claiborn was able to legally detain Pena. (See R., pp. 73-78.) Pena has failed to
show the district court erred when applied the correct factors and found that the encounter
was consensual up and until Officer Claiborn developed reasonable articulable suspicion
to detain Pena.

D.

Even If The Initial Encounter Was Not Consensual, Officer Claiborn Had
Reasonable Articulable Suspicion To Detain Pena
An officer may seize an individual if the officer has reasonable, articulable

suspicion that the individual has committed or is about to commit a crime. See Florida v.
Royer, 460 U.S. at 498; Terry, 392 U.S. at 22; Fry, 122 Idaho at 103, 831 P.2d at 945.
Pena argues that Officer Claiborn did not have reasonable articulable suspicion to detain
him and exceeded any time necessary to dispel any suspicions. (See Appellant’s brief,
pp. 20-30.) Pena’s argument is not supported by the record.
Even before Officer Claiborn saw the methamphetamine pipe he had reasonable
articulable suspicion to detain Pena. Pena was sitting in his running but parked car at
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3:15 a.m. (7/6/17 Tr., p. 8, L. 18 – p. 9, L. 25.) Pena did not have his headlights on. (Id.)
The car was parked in the furthest southeast corner of the Windham Hotel parking lot.
(Id.) The car was not parked near an entrance or an exit. (7/6/17 Tr., p. 9, Ls. 16-25.)
Pena parked in a dark and unlit part of the parking lot. (Id.) This area was a “high drug
area especially between the hours of midnight and four a.m.” (7/6/17 Tr., p. 9, L. 16 – p.
10, L. 8.) Car burglaries and trailer burglaries are also frequent in the area. (Id.)
Pena admitted he was on parole for burglary. (7/6/17 Tr., p. 13, Ls. 2-6; see also
Ex. 1 at 2:33 to 2:45.) Officer Claiborn looked in Pena’s car, without entering it, and saw
a saw sitting on the back seat. (7/6/17 Tr., p. 13, Ls. 11-21; see also Ex. 1 at 3:59 to
4:10.) A saw is a common tool used to cut locks during burglaries. (Id.) Officer
Claiborn had reasonable articulable suspicion that Pena was engaged in, or about to
engage, in some criminal conduct. It was reasonable for Officer Claiborn to continue to
ask Pena questions about what he was doing there, especially when Pena gave conflicting
answers. The district court did not err when it determined the initial encounter was
consensual. However, even if it did err, Officer Claiborn had reasonable articulable
suspicion to detain Pena, even before he saw the methamphetamine pipe.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the judgment of the district court.
DATED this 30th day of July, 2018.

/s/ Ted S. Tollefson
TED S. TOLLEFSON
Deputy Attorney General
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